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DEAN COMPTON, 
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Appellant. 
Case No. 14111 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff, a grain broker, filed this action 
against the defendant, a farmer, for damages for 
breach of contract alleging a verbal contract for 
the purchase of 15,000 bushels of wheat was entered 
into by the parties on August 3, 1973, and that a 
confirmation signed by plaintiff was mailed to 
defendant on August 14 and received August 15, and 
no written notice of objection was mailed by defendant 
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to plaintiff within ten days thereafter. 
".••'.'.• DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court submitted special interrogatories 
to the jury and granted judgment to the plaintiff for 
$13,150,00 damages against the defendant. 
• NATURE OF RELIEF SOUCKT ON APPEAL 
Defendant appeals for a determination that the 
purported contract did not exist, was unenforceable 
under the statute of frauds, the defendant being a 
farmer and not a merchant, and the purported confirmation 
having not been mailed within a reasonable time, actual 
notice of rejection having been received and admitted 
in open court by the plaintiff, and in any event the 
computation of damages was erroneous. 
" STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant for 25 years, either alone or with his 
father, has been a hay and grain farmer, (Tr« 100). 
He has never sold these commodities .for anyone other 
than himself nor any that wasn't produced on his farm, 
(Tr. 126). The plaintiff had previously, both hauled 
and bought defendantfs grain, (Tr. 128-131). The facts 
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are that on August 2, 1973, one or more telephone 
conversations between the parties occurred regarding 
the price of defendant's rye infested red wheat crop 
at his Sublet, Idaho Farm. Plaintiff's version of the 
telephone conversation appearing at (Tr. 18-18-31) 
and the defendant's version appearing at (Tr. 132-133) 
and both versions indicating that defendant would let 
his wheat go if he could get $3.30 or $3.31 per bushel 
and plaintiff stating that he would see if he could 
get that price. Thereafter plaintiff contacted 
Pillsbury and received a confirmation of sale to 
them (Tr. 19-4). No further contact or communication 
between the parties occurred until August 15, 1973, 
when defendant phoned plaintiff to see if plaintiff 
would haul defendant's wheat and plaintiff indicated 
(Tr. 29-17-24) he knew what the problem would be and 
told him among other things "you don't have any wheat, 
I've sold it - didn't you get my confirmation - ". 
The confirmation, Exhibit 2, was dated August 3, 
but appeared in plaintiff's pad of confirmations as 
No. 21 and followed Nos. 19 and 20, both dated August 
13, Nos. 16, 17, and 18, all dated August 8 and No. 15 
dated August 4, and was followed by Nos. 22 and 23 
dated August 14. (Tr. 68) (Def's Ex. #11) 
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On August 2, 1973 plaintiff claims to have 
sold the same 15,000 bushels of Tas is1 wheat to 
Pillsbury at $3.45 per bushel, but in fact is filling 
this Pillsbury contract with other wheat (Tr. 82-29) 
and (Exhibit 10) beginning on August 9th, six days 
before receiving notice of objection to his claimed 
contract with defendant. The market price of No. 1 
red wheat on August 2 (Tr. 63-14) and on August 3, 
(Exhibit No. 4) at Ogden, Utah, was $3.63 per bushel, 
an apparent difference in fas is1 wheat and No. 1 red 
wheat of 18<f: per bushel. There was no other direct 
evidence of the difference in Tas isT and No. 1 red 
wheat market price introduced at the trial, although 
in addition to the apparent indication of 18<j: difference 
on August 3, plaintiff in his testimony (Tr. Ill-lines 
14-20) applied a 19£ per bushel difference in September 
1973. The price of No. 1 red wheat fluctuated sharply 
and rose by as much as 90^ per bushel by August 8, 1973, 
(Tr. 79-32) yet no confirmation or other notice was 
mailed by the broker to the farmer until August 14, 
even though plaintiff by his own admission knew there 
would" be trouble and almost the first thing asked by 
him on the 15th was whether or not the confirmation 
had been received. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE QUESTION 
OF WHETHER OR NOT A CONTRACT EXISTED TO THE • 
JURY. 
It would seem clear the court should not 
have sumitted to the jury the question of whether 
or not a contract was entered into between the 
parties when the facts show that the plaintiff's 
allegation of the date of the contract, was August 
3, by Exhibit 2 purporting to confirm a contract 
"of this dayn on August 3, and no contact or 
communication occured between the parties on 
August 3. Further, it appears (Tr. 82-29) that 
plaintiff was buying wheat as early as August 9 
and had applied at least three loads to the Pillsbury 
contract prior to the time he mailed his purported 
confirmation to the defendant or received notice 
of the rejection of such confirmation (See Also, 
Exhibit 10). 
The section of the statute relied on by plaintiff 
is found in 70A-2-201: 
(2) "Between merchants if within a reasonable 
time a writing in confirmation of the contract 
and sufficient against the sender is received 
and the party receiving it has reason to know 
its contents, it satisfies the requirements of 
-6-
subsection (1) against such party unless written 
notice of objection to its contents is given 
within ten days after it is received.fl 
This statute indicates that the writing must be in confirma-
tion of a prior contract. Such contract would have had 
to have been completed on August 2, not August 3. 
Obviously neither plaintiff nor defendant treated the 
events of August 2, as completing a contract, the 
plaintiff waiting until he had sold 15,000 bushels of 
fas isT red wheat and having received a confirmation 
thereof and having begun filling that contract with 
other purchases. Plaintiff was well aware of the 
necessity for giving notice of the purported sale to the 
defendant as evidenced by his own testimony (Tr. 29-17 to 
24) he asked if defendant had received confirmation, and 
knowing that the defendant was going to tell him he 
wouldn't follow through. 
• POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO THE JURY THE QUESTION 
OF WHETHER THE PURPORTED WRITING (CONFIRMATION) WAS 
RECEIVED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME. 
Whether plaintiff backdated to August 3, the purported 
confirmation No. 21, Exhibit No. 2 on the 14th of August 
as it would appear from the other confirmations.which he 
was making on a more or less regular basis from August 
2, to August 15, or whether he simply held the confirma-
tion until the 14th of August is unknown* However, in 
;l; 
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light of the fact that plaintiff was well aware of the 
rapidly flutuating market, was regularly preparing con-
firmations of other sales, it would seem on its face so 
clear as to not require argument, that plaintiff delayed 
an unreasonable length of time in forwarding the confirmation. 
"Reasonable Time" means as soon as circumstances 
will permit. Lund vs. St. Paul M. § M. R. Co. 71 Pac 
1032 31 Wash 286. 
Generally "Reasonable Time" is a question of law; 
Alsam Holding Company vs. Consolidated Tax Payers Mutual 
Insurance Company,,N.Y.S. 2nd 498. 
"Reasonable Time" means so much time as is necessary 
under the circumstances. State vs. Commissioners of 
Cascade County 296 Pac 1 89 Montana 37. ••-./ 
"Reasonable Time" may be defined generally to be so 
much time as is necessary under the circumstances for 
a reasonable, prudent and diligent man to do conveniently 
what the contract or duty requires should be done, having 
regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any, 
to the other party to be affected. Citizens Bank Bldg. 
vs. Ellen E. Wertheimer 180 SW 361 126 Arkansan 38. 
Similar language used in Minnesota, Kentucky Cases. 
"Reasonable Time" if facts are clearly established 
or are undisputed, is a question of law. Hill vs. Hobart 
16 Main 164. "Reasonable Time" is so much time as is 
necessary under the circumstances to do conveniently 
-8-
what the contract or duty requires should be done in 
a particular case. A "Reasonable Time" when no time 
is specified is a question of law and depends on the 
subject matter and the situation of the parties* Cole-
fax County vs. Butler County 120 NW 444 83 Nebraska 803. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN SUBMITTING TO THE JURY 
THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT WAS A 'MERCHANT1. 
The court committed error in submitting to the jury 
the question of whether or not defendant was a fmerchant1. 
The record is clear that defendant was a farmer only, 
with the exception of a short period of time when he 
hired out as a mechanic. Defendant never sold or bought 
wheat for anyone other than himself and other than the 
sale of his own wheat has never dealt in grain, or 
otherwise by his occupation held himself out as having 
knowledge or skill peculiar to the grain trade nor has 
he employed an agent of broker or intermediary who by 
his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge 
or skill. Defendant should have been allowed to answer 
these questions even though without his answering such 
questions there is no evidence whatever in the record 
which would justify finding this defendant to be a 
merchant. We believe the case of Cook Grains Inc. vs. 
Paul Fallis, an Arkansas Case, 395 S.W. 2nd 555, 239 
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Ark 962, wherein the court pointed out that a farmer 
farming 550 acres of soybean land, 
"if the general assembly had intended that in 
the circumstances of this case a farmer should 
be considered a merchant and therefore liable 
on an alleged contract to sell his commodities, 
which he did not sign, no doubt clear and explicit 
language would have been used in the statute to 
that effect. There is nothing whatever in the 
statute indicating that the word 'merchant1 
should apply to a farmer when he is acting in the 
capacity of a farmer, and he comes within that * 
category when he is merely trying to sell the 
commodities he has raised" 
correctly states the law as it should be applied in Utah, 
and in the instant case. 
POINT IV. •
 r. 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO THE JURY THE QUESTION 
OF WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT HAD ADMITTED AN ORAL 
CONTRACT FOR SALE OF WHEAT. > y
 t .-• t. 4, 
Both the pleadings and all of defendant's testimony 
in court denied the existence of a contract between the 
parties and there was no evidence before the jury that 
the defendant admitted in his pleadings, testimony or 
otherwise in court that a contract was made. The court 
erroneously allowed in over objection testimony of what 
could have been no more than a compromise offer or gift 
to the prejudice of the defendant. But even having 
allowed that testimony in, it was not an acknowledgment , 
in court of the existence of a contract. The court 
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itself should have decided the question as a matter of 
law, and the submission to the jury of the question was 
prejudicial to defendant. 
POINT V. 
ADEQUATE NOTICE OF REJECTION WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BY 
PLAINTIFF'S SENDER AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN TREATED BY THE 
COURT AS SUFFICIENT WITHOUT THE REQUIREMENT OF WRITTEN 
NOTICE OF REJECTION. 
The notice of rejection which plaintiff acknowledged 
in open court to have received August 15th verbally from 
the defendant should have been as a matter of law treated 
as sufficient notice of rejection without requiring 
written notice. There seems no valid reason why verbal 
rejection acknowledged in open court to have been received 
should be given less affect than would be given an 
acknowledgment in court of the existence of a verbal 
contract. 
POINT VI. 
THE COURT ERRED IN THE COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. 
Even though plaintiff plead damages of $23,850.00 
and sdme testimony of purchases by plaintiff after August 
15th was erroneously admitted in evidence to the prejudice 
of defendant, it is clear from the record and from the 
arguments of counsel and from the statute that the most 
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that plaintiff could be entitled to as damages would be 
the difference in price of 'as is' wheat on the 3rd day 
of August as compared to the 15th day of August when 
plaintiff was advised that he would get no wheat under 
his claimed contract. Plaintiff's exhibits and testimony 
all point to the fact that No. 1 red wheat on August 2nd 
and 3rd was $3.63 per bushel at Ogden and the price on 
August 15th was $4.37 per bushel. Thus the maximum 
damages that could have been suffered by plaintiff was 
74$ per bushel. Since plaintiff did not haul defendant's 
wheat from Sublet, Idaho to Ogden, Utah, the court's 
use of the $3.30 figure was obviously error, and the 
court's submission to the jury of the question of the 
market value of 'as is' wheat was error under the circumstances 
The jury's finding of $4.25 market value of 'as is' wheat 
on August 15th cannot be reconciled with the evidence 
and particularly with Exhibit 4 and 5 or the other tes-
timony relating to the Ogden Market price of No. 1 red 
wheat. 
Further the evidence clearly shows and is undisputed 
(Tr. 18-16 to 22) wherein plaintiff testified that the 
only wheat under consideration was what wheat the defend-
and was in the process of harvesting or was about to 
harvest on his Sublet, Idaho farm. This figure produced 
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was in fact 12,000 bushels, (Tr. 137-31) Damages there-
fore could not exceed 74^ times 12,000 bushels or $8,880.00. 
However, defendant was entitled to two credits thereon 
even by the acknowledgment of the plaintiff's testimony 
that he was authorized to apply 983 bushels in September 
at $3.30 per bushel, Ogden, to the alleged contract* 
Further the plaintiff was saved the 15£ per bushel freight 
or trucking expense from Sublet, Idaho to Ogden, Utah. 
So that as to those 983 bushels, plaintiff did not suffer 
the 74<f per bushel loss ($727.42) and in fact saved-15£ 
per bushel freight ($147.45) expense for a total of $874.87 
that should have been deducted ($8,880.00 minus $874.87) 
thus $8,005.13 would be the maximum damages possibly 
suffered by plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
If any significance is to be given the words Tmerchant' 
and 'reasonable time' as used in the statute, then this 
seems a compelling case to determine that a full time 
farmer whose only brush with brokers or merchants comes 
when he sells his own produce once a year, is a 'farmer' 
rather than a 'merchant'. Likewise to permit a broker 
engaged full time in buying and selling grains, to delay 
12 or 13 days while he makes purchases and sales and 
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confirmations at rapidly increasing prices, to reap 
the benefit of his unexplained and unnecessary delay 
shocks the conscience. Such result should be avoided 
either by determination that the delay was unreasonable, 
or that having acknowledged in open court receipt of 
notice of rejection of the purported confirmation not 
yet delivered, such actual notice should be deemed at 
least equivalent to the ten day written notice which would 
have protected even a 'merchant1. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Omer J. Call 
Attorney at Law 
26 First Security Bank Bldg. 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant 
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